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Abstract
I study the effect of access to payday loans on the timing, level and
composition of consumption. Using a newly obtained military administrative dataset of sales at on-base grocery and department stores, I
examine how consumption behavior changes after the passage of a federal law that effectively bans military personnel from accessing payday
loans in some states but not others. The military setting is ideal for this
analysis because military personnel are assigned to locations across the
United States with varying degrees of access to payday loans. Furthermore, since military personnel face varying known wait times between
paycheck receipts throughout the year, I can examine daily consumption patterns in ways that were infeasible with previous datasets and
surveys. I first present evidence that food expenditures spike on payday
and are significantly lower at the end of a pay period; the fact that these
patterns hold for perishable goods like produce indicates that food consumption is also not smooth, even over a two-week period. Then using
a difference-in-difference framework, I find that payday loan access enables consumers to better smooth their consumption between paychecks,
with no detectable effect on the level of food consumption. These patterns imply that payday loans enable liquidity-constrained individuals
to smooth their consumption. However, I also find suggestive evidence
that they lead to temptation purchases. Military personnel purchase
more alcohol and electronics when given access to payday loans. Further evidence suggests that there may be significant heterogeneity in the
population, with indications of present-biased preferences among some
individuals and forward-looking, self controlled behavior among others.
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Introduction

Access to short-term credit, such as payday loans, may be beneficial to a
population that faces liquidity constraints over the short run. Payday loans
can provide a means for consumers to smooth consumption in the face of
income shocks. On the other hand, consumers may overborrow due to “presentbiased” preferences or vulnerabilities to temptation good consumption. Most
policy actions on payday loans are concerned with the latter issue, which leads
to various levels of restrictions on payday loans. Past studies on the effect
of payday loan access on household welfare find evidence for both outcomes
(smoothing consumption and overborrowing). Hence, no clear consensus has
been reached among researchers. I contribute to the understanding of the
effects of payday loans on households by focusing on an outcome variable
that occurs more frequently than those analyzed in previous studies, daily
consumption. This is important because low frequency outcome variables may
not be able to pick up on the nuanced short-term effects of payday loans.
Hence, if one believes payday loans are used to smooth consumption between
paycheck receipt, than one needs to look at an outcome variable that occurs at
a higher frequency than loan length. In this paper, I investigate how payday
loan access affects the timing, level and composition of household consumption.
This is one of the first papers that connects payday loans to consumption1 and
connects credit, in general, to high-frequency consumption.2
To uncover the impact of payday loans on food consumption, my research
design takes advantage of a natural experiment that changed the availability
of payday loans to military personnel across states and time in the United
States. As a result of the Military Lending Act, military personnel and their
dependents lost access to payday loans nationwide starting in October 2007.
This change did not affect personnel assigned to locations where payday loans
1

Karlan and Zinman (2010) find that access to expensive payday loan type instruments
offered in a field experiment increased measures of food security in households 6 months
after initial loan take up.
2
Agarwal, Bubna and Lipscomb (2012) analyze the daily spending patterns of credit and
debit card holders from a large financial institution in India.
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were already inaccessible or illegal,3 but it did end availability for personnel
in payday loan accessible locations. I use this policy change in a difference-indifference framework that compares military populations that did and did not
lose access to payday loans as a result of the law change. As the majority of
military personnel cannot choose where to locate, some endogeneity concerns
are alleviated.
To get a measure of military consumption, I obtained sales data using several Freedom of Information Act requests. This data came from on-base grocery stores, Commissaries, and on-base department stores, Exchanges. These
stores are not open to the general public and provide a convenient and cheap
source of daily consumption needs.
Since personnel are all paid on known and regular pay dates, I was able to
observe how they shop between paychecks. I find that expenditures spike on
payday and are significantly lower at the end of a paycycle. Commissary sales
on paydays can be 20-25% higher than sales on non-paydays. This finding
cannot be explained by the timing of price changes. The military setting
also allows me to analyze how spending patterns vary by wait time between
paychecks, a variation unavailable in any previous consumption or expenditure
dataset. The difference between payday and non-payday spending increases
the longer consumers have been waiting to receive their paychecks. The pattern
persists for perishable goods like produce. This raises doubts that consumers
use paydays solely as focal points for shopping. I argue that this sales pattern is
evidence that the military population faces liquidity constraints and therefore
reveals that food consumption is not smooth, even over a two-week period.
Using a difference-in-difference framework, I find that payday loan access
relieves some of the liquidity constraints that consumers face by allowing them
to smooth consumption between paychecks. This smoothing effect is stronger
when the duration between paychecks is longer. Furthermore, this ability to
smooth with payday loan access is not associated with a large drop in the level
of food consumption.
I also find that military personnel purchase more alcohol and electronics
3

Payday loans were banned in 9 states in the time period of study.
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when given access to payday loans. The increase in good consumption in some
categories may be explained by cost savings that payday loans provide over
alternative credit substitutes or positive income gains from prompt access to
credit. On the other hand, it may indicate that payday loans lead to temptation purchases at the cost of other goods and savings. Further evidence
suggests that there may be significant heterogeneity in the population. There
are signs of present-biased preferences within the population. However, a significant portion of the population also display time-consistent, forward-looking
behavior capable of budgeting in atypically long paycycles.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 overviews the military population,
payday loans and the 2007 Military Lending Act; Section 3 describes the main
data and the empirical strategy that will be used in this paper; Section 4
examines how payday loan access affects the timing, level and composition
of consumption; Section 5 tests for the presence of time inconsistency and
rational foresight in the population; Section 6 concludes.

2

Institutional Background

2.1

Military

In 2007, the military employed 1.4 million active duty personnel.4 Associated
with these personnel are more than 1.8 million spouses, children and adult
dependents. 55.2% are married and 43.2% have children. 14.4% of active duty
personnel are women and 35.9% identify as minorities. The average age of
an active duty member is 28.3 years. 46.3% of personnel are 25 years old or
younger. 17.8% have Bachelor’s degrees or higher while 80.2% have at least a
high school diploma and possibly additional education less than a Bachelor’s
degree.5 83.8% of personnel are enlisted while the rest are Officers.
All active duty personnel are paid on the 1st and the 15th of each month,
or the closest business day preceding these dates if they should fall on a federal
4

2007 Demographics Profile of the Military Community, Department of Defense.
The remainder have unknown educational attainment or have no high school diploma
nor GED
5

4

holiday or a weekend.6 Pay is based on rank and years of service. For example,
in 2007 base pay for an enlisted individual ranked E-4 (the most common rank)
with 3 years of service was $24,000 a year. The military also provides tax-free
cash food allowances (e.g. $3,359/year for E-4) and tax-free cash housing
allowances (varies by location but on average it is $10,928/year for E-4 with
no dependents and $13,815/year with dependents). Non-cash compensation
includes comprehensive health care for personnel and dependents and military
housing in place of the housing allowance. In order to compare the military’s
cash and non-cash compensation to civilian pay, the Department of Defense
calculates a figure called Regular Military Compensation (RMC). In 2006, the
average enlisted member had an RMC approximately $5,400 greater than his
civilian counterpart.7
Active duty personnel and their families typically move to a new station
every 24 to 48 months. Approximately 1/3 of active duty personnel must move
each year. Enlisted personnel have little control as to the location of their
placement. Finally, according to the military, all members are equally likely
to be assigned to a particular base after controlling for rank and occupation
(Lleras-Muney, 2010).

2.2

Payday Loans

Payday loans are small short term loans with a duration of a week or two. A
typical loan size ranges $250-$300 with fees between $15-$20 per $100 borrowed
(Flannery and Samolyk, 2005). Assuming a 14 day loan, this implies APR
rates of 390-520%. A potential borrower must have a checking account and
proof of income in order to take out the loan. In exchange for the loan a
borrower writes a check for the amount of the loan plus the fee and postdates
it to her payday. When payday comes, the borrower can rollover the account
to a subsequent payday for a fee, repay the loan amount plus fee and have the
check returned to her or let the payday loan shop cash the check.
Despite the high cost of this form of credit and its short maturity, the payday loan industry has exploded since the 1990s. In 2006, there were more than
6
7

http://www.uscg.mil/ppc/mas.asp
The Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (2008)
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24,000 payday loan shops in the U.S., more than the number of McDonald’s
and Starbuck’s restaurants combined.8
Advocacy groups and policy makers have intensely criticized payday loans
in the last decade leading to many regulations. In 2005, at the beginning of
the time frame of interest in this paper, 9 states effectively or fully banned
payday loan operations. The rationale behind these bans is that the targeted
borrowers have self-control problems or they overestimate their abilities to
repay. These borrowers then find themselves unable or unwilling to cover
their debt burden, which in turn leads to repeated borrowing and increased
costs. Payday loan lenders claim that they are providing a credit instrument
to the underbanked that is designed to aid borrowers in bridging consumption
until paycheck receipt. Elliehausen and Lawrence (2001) present an example in
which it would be cheaper for an individual to take out a payday loan to repair
his vehicle immediately rather than wait till the arrival of his next paycheck
and take public transportation. This is because the present value of the cost
of taking public transportation in terms of fare and time was greater than the
payday loan fee minus gas, maintenance and car depreciation. Furthermore,
payday loan lenders claim that payday loans can be a cheaper alternative to
substitutes such as overdraft fees and late credit card payment fees.
Research findings on the effects of payday loans is mixed. Many find that
payday loan access has negative effects on borrowers: Campbell, MartinezJerez and Tufano (2012) find that access to payday loans leads to forced debit
and checking account closures due to excessive overdrafts; Skiba and Tobacman
(2011) find that payday loans access leads to increased Chapter 13 bankruptcy
filings; Melzer (2011) finds that payday loan access increases the difficulty of
paying bills and leads households to postpone seeking medical care. On the
other hand, some papers find positive effects from credit access: Morgan,
Strain and Seblani (2012) find that individuals bounce fewer checks; Morse
(2011) finds that payday loans mitigate the effects of income shocks caused by
natural disasters as measured by foreclosures and larceny rates. Bhutta (2014)
and Bhutta, Skiba and Tobacman (2015) find no effect of payday borrowing
8

Carrell & Zinman (2014)
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on credit scores, delinquencies and likelihood of overdrawing credit lines. As
mentioned above, this study is the first to look directly at the impact of payday loans on daily consumption, an outcome variable that occurs at a higher
frequency than loan length.

2.3

Military Lending Act9

In 2006 the Department of Defense presented a report to Congress pushing for
restrictions on high-cost small dollar credit products to military personnel. As
a result the Talent-Nelson amendment was added to the John Warner National
Defense Authorization Act of 2007, setting a national usury cap on loans issued to military personnel and their dependents. The Department of Defense
referenced the high take up of payday loans by the military population – Tanik
(2005) estimates that 19% of military personnel have used payday loans versus
6.75% of the civilian population, which may be related to the phenomenon of
payday loan shops locating near military installments in greater densities than
in comparative locations according to Graves and Peterson (2005). The Department of Defense argued that high-cost small dollar credit products harm
troop morale and readiness due to resulting financial stress. In fact, Carrell
and Zinman (2014) find that this is the case among young air force personnel. Furthermore, financial distress may make personnel vulnerable to loss of
security clearance.
The 2006 Talent-Nelson amendment led to the Military Lending Act (MLA)
coming into law on October 1, 2007. The MLA put restrictions on several types
of loans lent to active duty personnel or their dependents. Most significantly,
the MLA enacts a cap of 36% APR.10 It also prohibited these loans from
being secured by checks, electronic access to bank accounts or vehicle titles.
Rollovers and renewals are not allowed unless they are done at no extra cost.
In addition, active duty personnel and their dependents cannot enter into
mandatory arbitration or waive legal rights. These restrictions effectively ban
9

A nice summary of the passage of the Talent-Nelson amendment as well as details of
the MLA can be found in Fox (2012). Information in this section was gathered from that
paper.
10
Affected loans are less than $2,000 in size and less than 91 days in term.
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payday lending to active duty personnel.
Lenders must determine in the loan application process if potential borrowers fall under the MLA. This can be done in several ways. Lenders can
look at the employer names on pay stubs that are often required in the application process. They also have access to a Department of Defense database to
query a potential borrower’s active duty status. Many payday loan stores add
a statement to their application form that borrowers must check off in order
to receive a loan. For example, Advance America has the following statement:
“I attest that I am not a regular or reserve member of the Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or Coast Guard, serving on active
duty under a call or order that does not specify a period of 30
days or less. Nor am I an Active Guard and/or Reserve member
of the military currently serving on active duty or who has served
on active duty within the past 180 days, nor am I a spouse, child,
or other dependent person who derives more than one-half of my
monetary support from a member of the military who is on active
duty or has been on active duty within the past 180 days.”
Fox (2012) found that the MLA was effective in curbing payday loan usage
among the military population because of a sharp decrease in the number
of military aid society cases related to payday loans, an increase in closures
of payday loan stores near some military bases and a scarcity of violations
reported by State oversight agencies.

3
3.1

Empirical Strategy
Data

I will be using sales data from grocery and department stores located on or
near military bases. The grocery stores, also known as Commissaries, are
operated by the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) and carry food and
household items excluding alcohol. They sell mostly brand name goods and
do not have a store private label (Wright 2007). The department stores, or Exchanges, sell more durable items such as appliances, clothing and housewares
8

and operate convenience stores where they sell food and drink items. They
also sell alcohol and private label goods. Exchanges are run by various branch
specific organizations.11 Neither Commissaries nor Exchanges are open to the
general public. Only active duty military, reservists, retirees, family members
and authorized civilians working overseas can access them. Commissary and
Exchange usage is considered part of the benefits package of military service
due to their convenience and cost savings. For example, because they receive
federal funding, Commissaries are not-for-profit and can only sell goods at cost
plus a 5% surcharge by law.12 There are no taxes charged at either Commissaries or Exchanges.13 As a result, DeCA reports a price savings of 30% on
goods purchased at Commissaries as compared to those purchased at other
comparable stores (DeCA, 2008).14 Exchanges are for profit but tend to sell
certain goods at or below local prices.15 Thus it is reasonable to expect that
Commissary and Exchange take up is high.
I obtained sales figures from military Commissaries and Exchanges across
the United States via Freedom of Information Act requests from DeCA, the
Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and the Navy Exchange Ser11

Army and Air Force Exchanges are run by the Army and Air Force Exchange Service.
Marine Exchanges are run by the Marine Corps Exchange System. The Navy Exchanges
are run by the Navy Exchange Service Command.
12
The funds from the surcharge are used to cover facility modernizations and new building
costs. Costs of regular operations are funded by an appropriation by the Department of
Defense (DeCA, 2008). Costs of the actual goods are funded by their resale.
13
The only exception to this is gasoline sold at Exchange gas stations. Gasoline is not in
my data set. http://www.shopmyexchange.com/exchangestores/faq.htm#13 .
14
A DeCA operational goal is to provide a level of “customer savings” compared to other
grocery stores. This customer savings measure is reported annually. Prices are collected from
major grocery stores, supermarkets and superstores, either through databases or physical
audits, and compared to those at commissaries. In the calculations, taxes are included in
non-commissary good prices while the 5% surcharge is included in commissary good prices.
15
A price floor needed to be placed on tobacco, alcohol and gas prices as outlined in
DoD Instruction 1330.09. These floors put a limit on how much lower prices for these
goods could be compared to those in the local market. For example, liquor prices cannot be priced more than 10 percent less than the best local shelf price in Alcohol Beverage Control (ABC) States and 5 percent less than the best local shelf price in non-ABC
States. “Local” is not defined and there are indications that these pricing directions are
not always followed. An example of this can be found in the report by Marketplace:
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/economy/maps-military-tobacco.
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vice Command (NEXCOM). Commissary and Exchange data provide a highquality measure of consumption since they capture a large fraction of purchases
for the military population. This will be particularly true for food, alcohol
and tobacco products. Because the data are administrative rather than selfreported, there is less scope for measurement error than similar data collected
via a household survey or the home-scanning of purchases.
On the other hand, there are some limitations to this data. The data is
aggregated at the base level rather than the individual level. This will prove
problematic for several reasons. First, I cannot separate out retiree household
purchases (who are not affected by the MLA) from active duty household
purchases. I am able to control for retirees in some of the specifications I
use. Another shortcoming of the data is that it is expenditure data rather
than consumption data. Though it may be appropriate to approximate low
frequency consumption (such as monthly) with low frequency expenditures,
this is not an appropriate procedure for approximating daily consumption. I
will argue that daily consumption information can be gleaned from this daily
high-frequency expenditure data. Finally, this data is not comprehensive of all
consumption, spending and lifestyle choices of the population. Thus, though I
will be able to make statements about food and some durables, further study
needs to be made on these other outcome variables.
Commissary sales figures at the store-day-product category level from October 2001 to September 2013 span 173 bases from all branches of the military
across 45 States.16 There are two sets of sales data from Exchanges. The first
is at the store-month-product category level from October 2005 to September 2011 spanning 70 AAFES stores across 34 States. The second is at the
store-day-product category level from January 2012 to April 2015 spanning 84
NEXCOM stores across 15 States.17 Commissary total sales can be broken
16

Two commissaries are dropped because they do not span the length of the study period
of interest and six others are dropped because of structural changes (e.g. an opening of a
new store facility, closings for renovations) or if their operation was affected by Hurricane
Katrina.
17
Only NEXCOM stores that sold beer throughout the whole time period were analyzed.
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up into three product categories: Produce, Meat and Grocery.18 Exchange
categories include Electronics, Alcohol, Luxury, Tobacco, Commissary-Like,
Clothing, Uniforms, Entertainment, Home, and Appliances. Subcategories
that make up each Exchange category are listed in Appendix Table 1.19

3.2

Identification Framework

I will be examining how the timing, level and composition of consumption at
stores with varying levels of accessibility to payday loans changed as a result
of the MLA. Such an analysis will allow me to uncover the effect of payday
loan access on military consumption.
Variation of store accessibility to payday loans can be gleaned from the
map in Figure 1. The squares and circles on the map represent the locations
of the Commissaries and Exchanges in my dataset. The states that banned
payday loans before the passage of the MLA are signified by grey shading.20
Stores marked by squares have at least one payday loan shop within their 10
mile radius while those marked by circles do not.21
I will be using a differene-in-difference framework to conduct my analysis.
Treatment will be some measure of payday loan access and it is administered
in the pre-ban (pre-MLA) period on the treatment group. There are 3 different
ways to assign store treatment:
18

The Grocery category is a catchall for all products that are not produce or meats.
For AAFES data, used in the main identification, only subcategories that are present in
all stores are included in Exchange categories. Total (AAFES) Exchange sales are calculated
from the sum of these categories and hence may not match overall total store sales due to
the omitted subcategories.
20
Regarding Maine, I differ from Graves and Peterson (2008) in my assignment of payday
loan legality. Through the State of Maine Agency License Management System, I was able
to find records of payday loan stores in Brunswick and Bangor, two cities that contain
commissaries. However, there seem to be only 5 licensed payday loan stores in the whole
state in 2007. There also is no payday loan shop location data for Washington, D.C. Thus,
the number of payday loan shops within 10 miles of some stores in Washington, D.C.,
Virginia and Maryland may be underestimated. However, those stores that are vulnerable
to underestimation were checked to be assigned as having at least one payday loan shop in
their 10 mile radius.
21
Commissary addresses were gathered from the DeCA website. Payday loan store locations were obtained from supplementary files from Graves and Peterson (2008) and downloaded from Steven Graves’ website. Graves and Peterson gathered addresses for 2007 from
state government sources if available, and business directories otherwise.
19
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1. “State Allow”: Being located in a state that allows payday loans between
October 2005 and September 2007. “State Allow” takes on values of 0
and 1.
2. “Near Shop”: Having at least 1 payday loan shop within a 10 mile radius
of the store, regardless of payday loan legal status in the state in which
the store is located. “Access” takes on values of 0 and 1.
3. “Number of Shops”: The number of payday loan shops within a 10 mile
radius of the store. “Number of Shops” is an integer top coded at 10.22
Summary statistics of store treatment assignment can be found in Table 1.
As a result of the Military Lending Act, pay day lending was effectively
banned nationally to military personnel starting on October 2007. This change
did not affect personnel in areas where payday loans were already inaccessible
or illegal, but it did end availability for personnel in payday accessible areas. I
will use the difference-in-difference framework to compare military populations
that did and did not lose access to payday loans with the law change. Opposite of the typical difference-in-difference framework, where neither group has
access to the treatment until it is administered in the post-regulation period to
the treatment group, this setup has treatment administered at the beginning
of the experiment and then taken away in the post-regulation period. In the
main analysis, I focus on a five year window surrounding the enactment of the
MLA, October 2005 thru September 2010 23 and the “Near Shop” measure of
treatment.
The military setting has features that reduce concerns over endogeneity
in this identification strategy. Store prices on most goods are set nationally
to the same price and changed at the same time in all stores. Thus, no one
22

Number of shops is top coded at 10 shops to address the concern that results are skewed
by outliers. As was seen in Table 1, there are some stores that are surrounded by a very
large number of payday loan shops. All interpretation of results presented in this section
are not changed by top coding. In fact, results are more statistically significant if number
of shops is not top coded.
23
No states drastically changed their payday loan laws during the pre-regulation or “preban” period of October 2005 thru September 2007.
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store can set prices based on whether or not its patrons have access to payday loans. Second, as stated in the Institutional Background section, military
personnel, especially enlisted personnel, do not have much choice in their geographic placement. Thus, the consumers in our population cannot self-select
into locations based on payday loan availability. This makes the composition of the military personnel more similar across "treated" and "untreated"
groups. There might still be heterogeneity among the treated and untreated
groups even if individuals do not select into groups. More on this will be discussed in the Appendix where I attempt to control for such differences using
a propensity score matching technique.

4
4.1

Payday Loan Impact on Consumption
Timing

In order to analyze how payday loan access impacts the timing of consumption, I have to first establish what the timing pattern looks like without the
introduction of payday loans. To do this I will present the pattern of sales
between paycheck receipts. I will then argue that this expenditure pattern is
indicative of the underlying consumption pattern.
4.1.1

Paycycle Consumption Patterns

I define the term “paycycle” as the span of time between two paydays and
inclusive of the first payday. Since all active duty personnel are paid on the
same days, I can track the pattern of their paycycle spending. I conduct all
the analysis in this section on the post-ban period (October 2007-September
2010) data when no active duty personnel can access payday loans. I focus on
Commissary sales in this section.
To establish the paycycle expenditure pattern, I use the following specification:
LogSalesit = α + β 0 DaysSincePaydayt + φt + θi + it

(1)

where LogSales is the natural logarithm of daily sales for store i on date t;
DaysSincePayday is a vector of indicator variables pertaining to the number of days t is from the closest preceding payday; φ are controls for time
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(specifically: day of week, federal holidays, Social Security payout days;24 and
paycycle25 indicator variables); θ are store fixed effects and  is an error term.
The DaysSincePayday indicators range from 1 to 18, omitting 0 (payday).
The estimates of β for total store sales are plotted by the solid black line
in Figure 2. All estimates of the DaysSincePayday coefficients except for
“18” are significantly different from 0 at the 1% level and are negative. There
is a spike in sales on and around payday as compared to sales on other days in
the paycycle. Specifically, there are periods of time starting from 3 days after
payday and ending 14 days after when store daily sales are 20-25% lower than
their payday levels.
Some banks and credit unions that cater to military personnel offer special
checking accounts that provide access to military pay earlier than payday. An
example of a pay schedule is presented in Appendix Figure 1 from USAA
Bank. As can be seen in the figure and stated on USAA Bank’s website, funds
are provided one business day before payday. I want to control for these early
payout days because they act as paydays. I augment the previous specification
as follows:
LogSalesit = α + β 0 DaysSincePaydayt +

(2)

γ 0 DaysSincePaydayt × EarlyAccesst + φt + θi + it
where all variables are as before and EarlyAccess is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if an observation is on or after the last business day of a paycycle. Estimates of β are plotted by the dotted black line in Figure 2.26 Indeed there is a
noticeable difference in pattern: namely, sales stay in the 20-25% range below
payday spending for the remainder of the paycycle. Using another specification:
LogSalesit = α + φt + θi + βP aydayt + it

(3)

where P ayday is a dummy variable equal to 1 if t is a payday and φ includes
24

Useful to control for retiree shopping behavior.
Paycycle indicator variables are fixed effects for approximately every fortnight.
26
Since there are no paycycles that are longer than 19 days, there are no observations
that are 18 days since payday but are not one business day before a payday. Hence I do
not plot the estimate of the β coefficient on the 18th day since payday. It will, of course, be
almost the same estimate as in the model without early paycheck controls.
25
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controls for early paycheck days, I estimate that sales on paydays are, on
average, 22% higher than sales on non-paydays.27
The main takeaway from these figures is that spending on non-paydays is
significantly lower than on paydays or days when people have access to pay.
Such a pattern may arise if consumers are facing liquidity constraints that
are alleviated upon receipt of a paycheck. If consumers are facing binding
liquidity constraints, then the expenditure pattern is somewhat indicative of
the consumption pattern (i.e. though consumers would like to go shopping
so that they can consume, they cannot until receipt of their next paycheck).
Thus, I argue that these patterns are caused in part by liquidity constraints
and hence reveal aspects of the consumption pattern.
It is possible that consumers make their purchases mainly on paydays but
consume smoothly throughout the whole of the paycycle without facing any
liquidity constraints. This can happen because many of the goods purchased
from a grocery store are multi-serving and have some shelf life (e.g. cereal,
detergent). But certain goods are more perishable and would require more
frequent store visits to sustain a smooth consumption pattern. Expenditures
on the latter goods track consumption better than looking at store sales as a
whole. I examine the sales pattern of produce, the most perishable category in
my data set,28 to see if the purchasing spike on payday persists. If people are
smoothing consumption, then I would expect the paycycle spending pattern
to be much flatter. As one can see in panel (a) of Table 2, though there is
some flattening, the pattern of concentrated spending on paydays persists –
on average, produce sales on paydays are 16% higher than produce sales on
non-paydays. Thus, it is less likely that these consumers are smoothing their
consumption of produce.
I next rule out price changes as an explanation for the observed expenditure patterns. According to DeCA, if price changes on a product were to occur
(they do not occur every paycycle for every product), they would happen on
27
28

Estimates of β presented in panel (a) of Table 2.
As done in Stephens (2003, 2006)
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1st or the 16th of each month.29 Hence, Commissaries do not have one day
promotions to match the payday shopping behavior. Rather, prices change on
specific days and stay that way for at least a whole paycycle. It maybe that
consumers prefer to go to the store on the first day of a price change. Since
military personnel get paid twice a month, on the 1st and the 15th or earlier,
there are times in the beginning of the month when payday overlaps with price
change days. However, payday in the second paycycle of the month will never
overlap with a price change. If consumers are shopping on payday because of
a price change motive, then we would expect the payday expenditure spike to
not exist if we only look at second of the month paycycles. β estimates from
specifications 1 and 2 are plotted in Figure 2 in the Appendix. Concentrated
spending on payday persists even in these paycycles, placing doubt on a pricing explanation for the pattern. In fact, rather than a cost savings, it seems
like consumers incur costs by choosing to coordinate Commissary shopping on
payday. There is anecdotal evidence that consumers experience longer check
out lines and slower movement around the store on payday.30 Consumers’ tolerance for incurring these costs support the argument that they are desperate
to go shopping on payday due to their need to consume.
If consumers do face liquidity constraints, then an extra day’s wait for a
paycheck means that more consumers are waiting to go to the store the earliest
chance that they get and the larger the expenditure spike is on payday. To
test this story, I use the following specification:
LogSalesit = α + φt + θi + βP aydayt + γP aydayt × P reviousP aycycleLengtht
+it

(4)

where P reviousP aycycleLength is the number of days in the paycycle previous
to the paycycle of date t and the rest of the variables are defined as before. γ
is the percentage increase in payday sales as compared to non-payday sales for
every extra day consumers wait for payday to arrive. Estimates of γ are found
29

http://www.commissaries.com/documents/contact_deca/faqs/prices_commissary.cfm
Anecdotal evidence is from accounts by a commissary employee and military family members that I have spoken to as well as an article titled, “How to Navigate the
Commissary on Payday” from http://voices.yahoo.com/how-navigate-commissary-payday6413254.html?cat=46.
30
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in panel (b) of Table 2.31 Estimates of γ are positive, large and statistically
significant at the 1% level for all product categories. Every extra wait day for
a paycheck leads to an increase of 3.95 percentage points of the gap between
total payday expenditures and total non-payday expenditures in the paycycle
following the wait.
More people going shopping on payday as the wait time for paycheck receipt
increases fits a liquidity constraints story. However, the previous results do not
completely rule out a story in which consumers are not liquidity constrained at
all but rather use paydays as focal points for shopping. Though, in this case,
we would not expect to see a relationship between length of time between
paychecks and the number of people shopping on payday, we could possibly
see a relationship between length of time between paychecks and the quantity
bought (e.g. due to depleted pantries). However, this story, as opposed to one
with liquidity constraints, cannot explain expenditure patterns for perishable
goods and expenditure pattern changes caused by the introduction of credit
(as I find in the next subsection).
4.1.2

Payday Loan Impact on Timing of Consumption

A pattern of higher sales on paydays as compared to non-paydays due to liquidity constraints reveals an aspect of the underlying consumption. A decrease
in the gap between payday and non-payday sales would then indicate that consumers are able to smooth consumption more throughout their paycycle. To
see if payday loans impact the timing of consumption, I test if payday loan access leads to changes in the gap between payday and non-payday sales. Figure
3 illustrates the difference-in-difference specification used in this subsection.
Each point in this figure represents the difference between average log daily
sales on paydays and average log daily sales on non-paydays among specified
31

Panel (b) of Table 2 presents only the results for 14 day paycycles; the most common
paycycle length is 14 days. I analyze paycycles of fixed length to isolate the effect of wait
time for paycheck receipt from the effect of purchasing behavior by adjustments motivated
by the variation in current paycycle length (e.g. purchasing more/less on payday if the
current paycycle is long). Results for all paycycle lengths can be found in Appendix Table
2.
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Commissaries over certain time periods.32 The grey points connected by the
grey solid line are calculated for Commissaries that have at least one payday
loan shop within their 10 mile radius, while the black points connected by the
black solid line are calculated for those Commissaries that do not. Sales on
payday are 21.2% higher than on non-paydays in the post-ban period among
Commissaries not near payday loan shops. This gap is slightly higher, by
.06 percentage points, in the pre-ban period. Sales on paydays are 21.69%
higher than sales on non-paydays in the post-ban period among Commissaries
near payday loan shops. For identification, I assume that the gap between
payday spending and non-payday spending among commissaries near payday
loan shops would have followed the same trends from the post-ban period to
the pre-ban period as those of the Commissaries not near payday loan shops
had they not had access to payday loan shops (i.e. the payday gap would have
also increased by .06 percentage points to 21.74%, as indicated by the grey
points connected by the grey dashed line). Thus, I attribute any change in the
gap that is beyond a .06 percentage point increase to payday loan access. In
this case since sales on paydays is 20.14% higher than sales on non-paydays
in the pre-ban period among Commissaries near payday loan shops, payday
loan access caused a 1.6 percentage point decrease in the gap between payday
spending and non-payday spending. This is the difference-in-difference estimate of interest. Because payday loan access decreased the gap, we can infer
that payday loans had a smoothing effect on consumption. A 1.6 percentage
point change, in this case, is approximately a 7.4% decrease in the gap between
payday spending and non-payday spending.
The difference-in-difference specification is as follows:
LogSalesit = α + βP aydayt + γP aydayt × P reBant + δP aydayt × N earShopi +
ρP aydayt × N earShopi × P reBant + ηU nemploymentRateit
+φt + θi + ξit + it

(5)

where N earShop is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists at least 1 payday
32
Log Sales are adjusted for store fixed effects as well as day of week, federal holidays,
Social Security payout dates, early paycheck days and paycycle fixed effects before being
averaged.
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loan shop within a 10 mile radius of Commissary i; P reBan is a dummy
equal to 1 if an observation occurs before October 2007 (when there was no
federal ban on payday loans to military personnel); U nemploymentRate is the
monthly unemployment rate in Commissary i’s county; ξ are all the interaction
terms between day of week indicator variables and N earShop and P reBan and
all other variables are defined as before. Note that the P reBan main effect
is absorbed by the time control vector φ and the N earShop main effect is
absorbed by the store fixed effect vector θ. The (triple) difference-in-difference
coefficient of interest is ρ and measures how the difference between payday
and non-payday spending differ between treatment groups before and after
federal prohibition of payday loans. A negative ρ indicates that payday loan
access decreased the size of the gap between payday and non-payday sales.
In other words, a negative ρ means access to payday loans increases paycycle
smoothing while a positive ρ means that consumers have become more liquidity
constrained.
Estimates of β, γ, δ and ρ for Commissary total sales are presented in Table
3. The first column presents the estimates for all paycycles in our five-year
window. The coefficient estimate of ρ indicates an approximate 1.6 percentage
point decrease in the gap between payday and non-payday spending as a result
of payday loan access, though this is not statistically significant at the 10%
level. In the second column, the analysis is done on the subset of paycycles
that are preceded by 14 day or less paycycles. In this case, payday loan access
does not seem to have any clear effect on consumption smoothing as coefficient
estimates are fairly small. On the other hand, coefficients estimated for the
subset of paycycles that are preceded by paycycles that are longer than 14 days
are large and negative. Payday loan access closes the gap between payday and
non-payday spending by more than 3.4 percentage points (12.6%).33 Thus
33

Since payday sales may be affected by the day of week that the payday falls on, the
number of days of the paycycle and the number of shopping days that the store is open
within a paycycle I include controls for these interactions. Results are shown in the first
three columns in Appendix table 3. Inclusion of these controls produces larger and more
significant results (a 1.85 and a 3.97 percentage point decrease in the gap between payday
and non-payday spending significant at the 10 and 5% level for all paycycles and only
paycycles preceded by paycycles that are longer than 14 days, respectively).
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as more consumers face liquidity constraints waiting through a long paycycle,
more use payday loans. Furthermore, the end result of this payday loan usage
is smoother consumption and not increased liquidity constraints. Formally, I
would expect to see a greater payday loan smoothing effect as time between
paychecks increases. Indeed, I find this is true with strong significance by
running a quadruple difference-in-difference specification that examines how
the triple difference-in-difference estimate varies by preceding paycycle length.
Results and details are found in Appendix Table 4. Thus, payday loan access
does not bring forth a simple calendar effect, uniformly shifting when people
consume. Rather, consumers utilize payday loans more when paycheck wait
time increases. We see similar results in other Commissary product categories
as presented in Appendix Table 5. Furthermore, the results persist with other
specification of “Access” as seen in Appendix Table 6.
Figure 4 plots estimates of a specification in which the dummy P ayday in
Equation 5 is replaced by the indicator variables DaysSincePayday. The
solid line represents what the paycycles expenditure pattern in the treatment
group would have looked like in the pre-ban period if treatment was not administered. The dotted line represents the pattern with payday loan access.
As one can see, the pattern is flatter with payday loan access, indicating that
consumers purchase more on other days relative to payday and are not as
constrained to shop on payday.
I conduct robustness checks such as omitting the “transition” period around
the timing of the MLA, dropping Commissaries in states that also allow cartitle loans, using propensity-score matching to formulate the control Commissaries and including more time and store varying controls that interact with
theP ayday coefficient in the main specification. The main results persist and
can be found in the Appendix.
One may be concerned that the parallel trends identifying assumption of
the difference-in-difference framework (i.e. that the payday sales “spike” of
control and treated commissaries would follow the same trend in the absence
of payday loan access), may not hold, especially when isolating paycycles that
are preceded by more than 14 days of wait time between paycheck receipt. To
20

alleviate this worry, I present annual averages of the payday sales “spike” for the
mentioned paycycles by treated and control Commissaries from October 2001
thru September 201334 in panel (a) of Figure 5. We see that the payday sales
spikes of treated and control Commissaries generally follow similar trends with
the average sales spike of treated Commissaries lying above that of the control
Commissaries in the post-ban period. We see that that difference between
the two groups shrinks in the pre-ban period when treated Commissaries have
access to payday loans. I also present in panels (b) through (d) the trends
of other observables to support the comparability between groups. We see
that daily sales (foreshadowing the results in the next subsection), county
unemployment rates,35 and base populations36 trend very closely between the
two groups.

4.2

Level and Composition

The smoothing gains come with a cost. If payday loans are extremely harmful,
as in the case when consumers are very present-biased, we would expect to see
a large decrease in consumption levels when consumers have access to them.
This is because consumers are prone to over borrow and excessively rollover
loans leading to situations of elevated financial distress (Skiba and Tobacman
2008). However, payday loans may be helpful in situations where consumers do
not have such behavioral tendencies yet face unexpected liquidity constraints.
In this case we would expect to see a slight decrease in consumption, due to
the cost of interest on the loans, or an increase if payday loans are a cheaper
substitute to other available smoothing alternatives (e.g. overdraft fees) or
produce positive income (e.g. a loan used to repair a car that is used to get
to a job).
I use monthly sales data in this section. AAFES data are already at a
monthly frequency and I aggregate daily Commissary and data into monthly
34

Commissaries that did not have sales data available or experienced a structural break
at any point during this time period were dropped.
35
The main findings are unchanged even when controlling for the interaction of payday
sales spikes and unemployment rates as can be seen in the fourth through sixth columns in
Appendix Table 3.
36
Population data was only obtained from 2004 thru 2011.
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frequency for comparison.37 I run the following difference-in-difference specification:
LogSalesit = α + βP reBant × N earShopi + γLogP opulationit +

(6)

ηU nemploymentRateit + φt + θi + it
where LogSales is the log of monthly sales; LogP opulation is the natural logarithm of the population of the nearest bases(s) to store i in month-year t and
φ are month-year fixed effects. Estimates of the difference-in-difference coefficient, β, are presented in Table 4.38 β is interpreted as the percentage change
in sales as a result of access to payday loans. Panel (a) presents estimates
for Commissaries. I cannot find a clear effect, positive or negative, of payday
loan access on the level or composition of Commissary good consumption.39
None of the estimates are significant at the 10% level and their magnitudes
are small.
It is helpful to investigate whether I have the power to pick up any level
effects from payday loan access. A Department of Defense survey in 200540
estimates that the average loan taken out by active duty personnel is $360. If
personnel pay a $15 fee for every $100 borrowed, then they would incur a cost
of $54 for every paycycle that a loan is outstanding. The same Department
of Defense survey estimates that personnel take out approximately 4.6 payday
loans a year which are held on average for 3 paycycles. Thus, this means
that active duty personnel who use payday loans pay fees for approximately
7 months of the year. Assuming 19% of the military population uses payday
loans,41 then in any month, 11% of the active duty population has a loan
outstanding. If the whole cost of the payday loan is taken out of commissary
spending (i.e. $108 per month), then I do have enough power to pick up an
37

Results are unchanged with use of daily frequency Commissary data.
Commissary and Exchange stores were dropped if they could not be matched with
population data.
39
I assume that monthly expenditures on Commissary goods are close estimates of
monthly consumption.
40
Department of Defense (2006).
41
Tanik (2005).
38
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effect42 . However, if I assume a 0.346 income elasticity for food,43 a $1,844
monthly after-tax paycheck for an E-4 with 3 years of service, and 11% of after
tax income spent on food,44 leading to a $4.11 reduction in food spending per
month, then I do not have enough power to pick up the payday loan access
effect. Thus, conservatively, I can say that I do not find that payday loan
access has a very large effect on the level of food consumption though I do not
have power to pick up smaller effects.
Estimates for total AAFES sales, presented in panel (b), are approximately
6% higher when consumers have access to payday loans. These estimates are
significant at the 5% level and remain so even with different specifications of
“Access” as presented in Appendix Tables 7 and 8. Thus in neither the Commissary nor Exchange case do we see that payday loan access has a significant
negative cost on the level of consumption. Delving into specific product categories, I find that electronics and alcohol sales increased by more than 7%
with access to payday loans.45 46 Thus there is a compositional change in the
consumption of Exchange goods when consumers have access to payday loans.

5

Discussion

The results in Section 4 show that, on the one hand, payday loans allow
households to better smooth food consumption without noticeably affecting
food consumption levels. On the other hand, payday loan access leads to an
42

In fact, I have enough power to pickup a $70 drop in spending per borrower per month
at the 10% level.
43
USDA 2005 International Food Consumption Patterns.
44
Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2005. Table 3: Age of reference person: Average annual
expenditures and characteristics, for ages 25-34.
45
One confounding issue in Exchange data as opposed to that of the Commissary is that
the pricing of tobacco and all forms of alcohol track local or state prices due to regulations.
Checks that results in this section are not caused by exogenous price movements can be
found in the Appendix.
46
Running multiple significance tests (such as the 9 presented in panel (b) in Table 4)
on the same data may lead to spurious results as the probability of incorrectly rejecting
the null of no effect increases with more tests given a fixed significance level. By adjusting
the significance level for multiple regressions using the Bonferroni correction I find that
electronics and alcohol sales increased as a result of payday loan access at a 2.7% and 9.9%
significance level respectively. Thus, the results of the impact of payday loan access on
electronics sales and alcohol sales do not seem to be spurious.
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increase in the level of consumption of what some may categorize as “temptation goods.” One explanation for the increased consumption is that consumers
save money when they have access to payday loans and spend it on alcohol
and electronic products. This can be the case if payday loans are cheaper
substitutes for other available credit alternatives, such as overdraft protection
or late fees for utilities and credit cards. For example, a consumer who needs
$100 for two weeks will pay a $15-$20 fee if he takes out a payday loan but will
pay a median fee of $27 for overdraft protection.47 On the other hand, payday
loan access may enable overconsumption. This would happen if consumers
have present-biased preferences or are prone to temptation good consumption.
Overconsumption of certain goods or an increased debt burden comes at the
cost of other goods (e.g. lessons for children, rent, cable, savings) and lifestyle
choices (e.g. second jobs, borrowing in informal market, spouse entering labor
market). Unfortunately, I cannot directly test the validity of either explanation as my data is limited to Commissary and Exchange expenditures and not
all expenditures, savings and lifestyle choices for this population. Alternatively, I investigate or discuss reasons why the military population runs into
liquidity constraints. If consumers face liquidity constraints because they have
present-biased preferences, consume temptation goods or have an inability to
budget, then payday loan access may be costly to them. On the other hand, if
they are liquidity constrained when they are hit by unexpected income shocks,
payday loans can be beneficial. I will conduct one test to see if consumers may
possess present-biased preferences and two to see if consumers have foresight
about the length of their paycycle and can appropriately budget. Analysis in
this section will be done using post-ban period data for the longest period that
the data is available.

5.1

Present-biased Preferences

I will investigate the population’s potential for having present-biased preferences by looking at its daily discount rate. As argued in other studies of high
frequency consumption patterns e.g. Shapiro (2005), Huffman and Barenstein
47

Data is for 2006. Fee is a flat fee independent of overdraft amount. Source: FDIC
(2008)
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(2005), the existence of high daily discount rates may be indicative of the
presence of consumers with present-biased preferences. If this is the case, then
consumers may suffer negative effects when given access to payday loans as
they are prone to overborrow and enter into worse financial conditions (Laibson, 2007). To estimate a daily discount rate, I run the following specification
using daily Commissary sales data:
LogSalesit = α + βDaysSinceP aydayt + φt + θi + it

(7)

where DaysSinceP ayday is an integer indicating the number of days t is from
payday in the paycycle and all other variables are as before. β is interpreted
as the percentage change in sales for every day beyond payday. Results of β
estimates are presented in Appendix Table 15. What is of interest is the change
in daily consumption rather than the change in daily expenditures. I assume,
like Huffman and Barenstein, that the daily decline in consumption within
a paycycle is 50% of the decline in expenditures. Huffman and Barenstein
view this adjustment as a conservative lower bound of the daily decline in
consumption because the daily decline of expenditures on instant consumption
goods is 70% of the daily decline of total expenditures. In produce, the sales
category that most closely tracks consumption, sales go down by 1.5% a day.
Applying Huffman and Barenstein’s adjustment, these expenditure declines
imply consumption declines of 0.75% a day over a paycycle that is on average
15 days long. In comparison, Shapiro (2005) finds consumption declines close
to 0.4% over a 30 day food stamp paycycle.
If households are time-consistent exponential discounters and I assume that
no borrowing can occur as the consumer is in the post-ban period, 0 within
paycycle price changes, a 1.0008 gross interest rate on checking accounts48 and
log utility, then the 0.75% a day decline in consumption found in my data
implies a daily discount factor of 0.9925 and an annual discount factor of 0.06
which are much lower than reasonably expected. Hence, this result calls into
question the validity of consumers being exponential discounters.
If consumers are time inconsistent, such that consuming in the present
is much more valuable than consuming at other points in the future, have
48

FRED from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Federal.
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quasi-hyperbolic preferences and log utility then daily consumption declines
of .75% over 15 days calibrate parameters for the model that are in line with
previous studies on quasi-hyperbolic preferences.49 In fact, my estimates are
very close to those found by Shapiro for the food stamp recipient population.
The similarities between the consumption patterns of the military population
and that of food stamp recipients indicate that the military population may
posses present-biased preferences.
Another alternative explanation for high daily discount rates is presented
by Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010). They construct a model where individuals consume temptation goods (goods that give immediate benefit but have
no benefit for previous or future selves) where the proportion of marginal dollar that is spent on temptation goods is decreasing in consumption level. Such
consumers produce consumption patterns with observed discount rates that
appear much larger than they actually are. This is because individuals will
choose to consume more immediately rather than save money and they end
up spending the savings on temptation goods. In this model, the existence of
loans with no size limits would tempt consumers to borrow small amounts to
consume temptation goods. If electronics and alcohol fit the definition of a
temptation good, then the increase in their sales when payday loans are accessible would support such a story. Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) finds that credit
shoppers at a Mexican retail chain who have a tendency to purchase electronics and other luxury category items have much higher default losses than those
that do not posses this tendency. She proposes that these individuals have a
desire for indulgence and lower degrees of self control that fit a temptation
good purchasing model. The end result is that these individuals enter into
worse financial conditions after their purchases because of access to credit.
On the other hand, some of the consumption declines throughout the paycycle can be explained by food perishability and consumers who face shopping
costs. If it is optimal for consumers to conduct infrequent big shopping trips
rather than frequent small shopping trips due to costs to shopping, then they
will have less food as time passes due to food spoilage. Wilde and Ranney
49

For more details, see the Appendix and Shapiro (2005).
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(1998, 2000) document and model such a story among food stamp recipients.
They find that perishable foods are consumed the least towards the end of
a food stamp cycle by infrequent shoppers. In this case, consumers are not
present-biased or prone to temptation spending. Thus when these individuals
use payday loans leading to consumption smoothing, it is more likely as a
result of them facing unexpected income shocks.

5.2

Rational Foresight

Consumers may face liquidity constraints because they are bad budgeters or
have tendencies to under estimate future expenses or over estimate future income. This explanation is supported by recent survey results that found that
69% of storefront payday loan users took out their first payday loan to cover
reoccurring monthly expenses such as utilities, car payments and rent.50 If
consumers are bad budgeters, then they may not understand the real costs
of payday loans or have the capacity to pay them back. In this subsection, I
examine consumer budgeting ability. As stated before, the longer a paycycle
is, the more likely that individuals are hit by random shocks and become liquidity constrained. All these liquidity constrained individuals will go shopping
at the Commissary on payday because that is when they receive relief from
their liquidity constraints. Thus, holding all other things equal, the longer a
paycycle, the more people are hit by shocks, and the greater the coordination
of shopping on the closest subsequent payday. Greater coordination of shopping on payday leads to a larger magnitude of my liquidity constraint measure
of the gap between payday and non-payday spending. We would expect a
steady increase between the magnitude of liquidity constraint measure and
every extra day of a paycycle. However, some paycycle lengths are a lot rarer
than others. Given that paydays are typically on the 1st or 15th, paycycle
are mostly 14 to 17 days long. However, there are instances when paydays
are 18 and 19 days.51 If consumers are bad budgeters, I would expect that
they would become liquidity constrained in these longer than usual paycycles.
Thus, I test to see if liquidity constraint measures following longer than usual
50
51

The Pew Charitable Trusts (2012).
See Appendix Table 14 for summary of paycycle length.
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paycycles are higher than what would be predicted from just income shock effects. To do this, I run the specification in Equation 4, but I limit my sample
to paycycles that are 14 days long52 and that follow paycycles that are 17 days
or shorter. The predicted values of liquidity constraint by previous paycycle
length are plotted in panel (a) of Figure 6 by the dashed line. I extend the
line to previous paycycle lengths of 18 and 19 days that are not used in the
estimation. I then plot the average liquidity constraint measure for each paycycle length53 indicated by the squares and triangles in Panel A of Figure 6.
As can be seen, the liquidity constraint measures do not jump dramatically as
a result of longer than usual paycycle length.
I also explore how households consume within paycycles of different length.
In panel (b) of Figure 6 I plot the log of average daily sales of groceries and beer
by paycycle length, holding previous paycycle length constant at 14 days.54 I
find that while average daily grocery sales stay relatively constant across different paycycle lengths, average daily beer sales drop significantly in longer
paycycles. I also find that households cut beer consumption starting from the
first week of a long paycycle, as seen in panel (c) of Figure 6. Meanwhile, the
weekly spending pattern for groceries does not seem to vary much with paycycle length, as seen in panel (d) of Figure 6. Hence, it is clear that households
are very aware of paycycle length and cope with longer paycycles by reducing
beer consumption immediately upon entering a longer paycycle. Furthermore,
households are able to maintain low beer consumption throughout long paycycles. Such behavior may enable households to stretch their paycheck in order
52
As before, looking at paycycles of equal length enables me to isolate effects of liquidity
constraints from the effects of people purchasing more according to paycycle length.
53
I control for day of week, federal holidays, Social Security payout days, early paycheck
days, paycycle and store fixed effects jointly for all previous paycycle lengths. Again, dates
are limited to those that are in 14 day paycycles.
54
To ease comparison, I focus on paycycles that start on Fridays (the most common
payday), are preceded by paycycles that are 14 days long (the most common paycycle
length), occur in the second half of the month (as longer paycycles only occur here) and do
not include holidays. Grocery sales come from Commissaries that are open seven days a week
and span October 1, 2007 thru September 30, 2013. Beer sales come from Navy Exchange
stores that have at least 1,200 observation from the 1,218 days between December 30, 2011
and April 30, 2015.
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to consume food throughout the paycycle as well as maintain a larger savings
buffer in case of unexpected expenses. This finding may explain why alcohol
consumption increases with access to loans as households may feel less need
to hold a large savings buffer.
These two findings place doubt of an explanation in which this population cannot budget or is myopic to paycycle length. If a population has the
capacity to budget, then they may also have the ability to use payday loans
appropriately. Thus the population displays both time-inconsistency and ability to budget. A likely explanation of these results is that heterogeneity exists
among the population. Heterogeneity can possibly also explain varying conclusions from in previous research. Unfortunately, the aggregate nature of the
data limits me from exploring if the consumers who purchase more alcohol or
who shop in the most time-inconsistent fashion are the same as the ones who
budget and smooth their consumption.

6

Conclusion

Using a novel dataset I find that consumers can use payday loans to smooth
consumption without suffering a large decrease in their level of food consumption. On the other hand, I find that consumers are consuming more convenience and department store goods when given access to payday loans. It is
unclear whether consumers are paying a high cost for the smoothing ability or
are experiencing savings. There are indications that the military population
may have present-biased preferences or have tendencies to consume temptation
goods. However, they also show signs of being able to budget and exhibit self
control even if a paycycle is atypically long. If consumers are able to smooth
consumption because of payday loans and avoid high costs, then this sheds
some light on why demand for certain kinds of expensive short-term credit
such as borrowing from loan sharks and pawn shops have existed for so long
(Calder, 1999). If payday loans lead some to over consume, then these findings support survey and experimental evidence that payday loans have varying
welfare effects. In the survey conducted by Elliehausen and Lawrence (2001),
many payday loan borrowers claim that payday loans are helpful and should
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not be restricted in any way other than with a cap on fees while others ask for
greater restrictions to prevent themselves from over borrowing. Wilson et al.
(2010) find, in an experimental setting, that payday loan instruments assist
many subjects in surviving financial setbacks while others suffer compared to
subjects with no loan access. This paper provides evidence that payday loans,
even with their cost, can function like more mainstream credit and can provide
consumption smoothing benefits. Hence, blanket laws that ban payday loans
outright will benefit certain portions of the population while hurting others.
Alternatively, policies that allow payday loans to profitably exist while placing
limits on the maximum costs to borrowers, such as those recently proposed
by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,55 may be beneficial to more
borrowers. In general, it is of value to understand further which consumers
use payday loans in a way that is harmful (e.g. those that are highly timeinconsistent or susceptible to temptation good consumption) and which benefit
from smoothing without paying a high cost. With this information, a more appropriate assessment can be made of the total gains or losses of implementing
payday loan regulations.
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Figure 1: Commissary and Exchange Locations

Figure 2: Paycycle Sales Pattern

Note: Data from post-ban period that spans October 1, 2007 thru September 30, 2010.
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Figure 3: Difference between Average Log Daily Sales on Paydays and Average
Log Daily Sales on Non-paydays Among Commissaries

Note: Log Sales are adjusted for store fixed effects as well as day of week, federal holidays, 3rd of Month
Social Security days and paycycle fixed effects before being averaged. The log of daily sales is for total store
sales. A Commissary is designated to be “Near Payday Loan Shop” if there is at least one payday loan shop
within a 10 miles of the store. The pre-ban period spans October 1, 2005 thru September 30, 2005. The
post-ban period spans October 1, 2007 thru September 30, 2010.

Figure 4: Impact of Payday Loan Access on the Timing of Expenditures
Dependent Variable: Log Daily Total Sales
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(d) Base Population

(b) Daily Sales

Note: Log Sales are adjusted for store, paycycle, day of week, federal holidays, 3rd of Month Social Security days fixed effects as well as county monthly
unemployment rate before being averaged. The log of daily sales is for total store sales in paycycles that are preceded by more than 14 days without a
payday. A Commissary is designated to be “Near Payday Loan Shop” if there is at least one payday loan shop within a 10 mile radius of the store.

(c) Unemployment Rate

(a) Payday Expenditure Spike

Figure 5: Trends Through Time for Paycycles that are Preceded by More than 14 Days Without a Payday
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(d) Log of Total Weekly Sales by Paycycle Length: Grocery

(c) Log of Total Weekly Sales by Paycycle Length: Beer

Note: Panel (a) uses total daily sales data from Commissaries in paycycles that are 14 days long in the post-ban period that spans October 1, 2007 thru
September 30, 2013. Panel (b), (c) and (d) use daily sales data from paycycles that start on Fridays, are preceded by paycycles that are 14 days long, occur
in the second half of the month and do not include holidays. Grocery sales come from Commissaries that are open seven days a week and span October 1,
2007 thru September 30, 2013. Beer sales come from Navy Exchange stores that have at least 1,200 observation from the 1,218 days between December 30,
2011 and April 30, 2015.

(b) Log of Average Daily Sales by Paycycle Length

(a) Payday Sales Spike by Preceding Paycycle Length

Figure 6: Paycycle Sales Pattern
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Note: “State Allows” indicates that it is legal for a payday loan shop to operate in the state. Having “Near Shop” is defined as a
Commissary or Exchange being within 10 miles of at least one payday loan shop. Commissary and Exchange stores with structural
changes (e.g. an opening of a new store facility, closings for renovations) or that were affected by Hurricane Katrina are dropped.
Exchange data here only from Exchanges run by Army and Air Force Exchange Services. Total monthly store sales used to calculate
average monthly sales in Exchanges are the sum of sales in the product categories that are present in all stores for all periods (See
Table 1 in Appendix) and thus are lower bound of that measure. Exchange stores that could not be matched to base population data
were dropped as they were not used in analysis.
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Number of Exchanges

State Allows

136

Number of Commissaries

State Allows

Commissaries

Table 1: Store Statistics

Table 2: Payday Spending Spike by Product Category
Dependent Variable: Log Daily Sales
(a) Payday Spending Spike

Payday
N

Total
0.22∗∗∗
[0.20,0.23]
165566

Grocery
0.22∗∗∗
[0.20,0.23]
165566

Produce
0.16∗∗∗
[0.15,0.17]
162426

Meat
0.25∗∗∗
[0.23,0.26]
157976

(b) Payday Spending Given Previous Paycycle Length for 14 Day Paycycles

Payday x PreviousPaycycleLength
N

Total
0.0395∗∗∗
(0.0014)
72304

Grocery
0.0388∗∗∗
(0.0014)
72304

Produce
0.0349∗∗∗
(0.0012)
70927

Meat
0.0550∗∗∗
(0.0019)
68986

Note: Panel (a) presents the estimates of the β coefficients in the following regression:
LogSalesit = α + φt + θi + βP aydayt + it
and Panel (b) presents the estimates of the γ coefficients in the following regression:
LogSalesit = α + φt + θi + βP aydayt + γP aydayt × P reviousP aycycleLengtht + it
where LogSales is the natural logarithm of daily sales of a product category for Commissary
store i on date t; φ are controls for time (specifically: day of week, federal holidays, Social
Security payout days; early paycheck days and paycycle indicator variables); θ are store fixed
effects, P ayday is a dummy variable equal to 1 if t is a payday and P reviousP aycycleLength
is the number of days in the paycycle previous to the paycycle of date t. Errors are clustered
at the store level and the 95% confidence interval for the esteemed coefficients are in brackets.
Commissary stores with structural changes (e.g. an opening of a new store facility, closings
for renovations) or that were affected by Hurricane Katrina are dropped. Sales are from the
post-ban period of October 1, 2007 thru September 30, 2010.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 3: The Impact of Payday Loan Access on the Timing of Expenditures:
Commissaries

Payday

Dependent Variable: Log Total Daily Sales
Previous Paycycle Length
All
14 Days or Less
∗∗∗
0.2101
0.1894∗∗∗
(0.0249)
(0.0229)

>14 Days
0.2267∗∗∗
(0.0282)

Payday x PreBan

0.0040
(0.0093)

0.0005
(0.0079)

0.0270∗
(0.0145)

Payday x NearShop

0.0054
(0.0246)

-0.0087
(0.0229)

0.0212
(0.0274)

Payday x NearShop x PreBan

-0.0162
(0.0104)
275999

-0.0008
(0.0095)
156183

-0.0346∗∗
(0.0162)
119816

N

Note: Table presents the estimates of the β, γ, δ and ρ coefficients in the following triple
difference-in-difference specification:
LogSalesit = α + βP aydayt + γP aydayt × P reBant + δP aydayt × N earShopi +
ρP aydayt × N earShopi × P reBant + φt + θi + ξit + it
where LogSales is the natural logarithm of daily total sales for Commissary store i on date
t; P ayday is a dummy variable equal to 1 if t is on payday; P reBan is a dummy equal to 1
if t is in the pre-regulation period of October 1, 2005 thru September 30, 2007; N earShop
is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists at least 1 payday loan shop within a 10 mile radius of
the Commissary; φ are controls for time (specifically: day of week, federal holidays, Social
Security payout days, early paycheck days and paycycle indicator variables); θ are store fixed
effects; ξ are all the interaction terms between day of week indicator variables, N earShop
and P reBan and  is an error term. Errors are clustered at the state level and are in
parentheses. Commissary stores with structural changes (e.g. an opening of a new store
facility, closings for renovations) or that were affected by Hurricane Katrina are dropped.
Sales are from the period of October 1, 2005 thru September 30, 2010.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 4: The Impact of Payday Loan Access on the Level and Composition of
Expenditures
Dependent Variable: Log Monthly Sales
(a) Commissaries
NearShop x PreBan
N

Total
0.0050
(0.0183)
9420

Grocery
0.0082
(0.0182)
9420

Produce
0.0039
(0.0201)
9420

Meat
-0.0184
(0.0245)
9420

(b) Exchanges
NearShop x PreBan
N
NearShop x PreBan
N

Total
Commissary-Like Alcohol
0.0611∗∗
0.0363
0.0774∗∗
(0.0247)
(0.0292)
(0.0289)
4200
4200
4200
Uniforms
-0.0253
(0.0331)
4200

Appliances
0.0444
(0.0525)
4200

Electronics
0.0791∗∗∗
(0.0250)
4200

Tobacco
0.0506
(0.0312)
4200

Home
0.0491
(0.0373)
4200

Clothing
0.0176
(0.0387)
4200

Entertainment
0.0006
(0.0427)
4200

Note: Table presents the estimates of the β coefficients in the following regression:
LogSalesit
=
α + βN earShopi × P reBant + γLogP opulationit +
ηU nemploytmentRateit + φt + θi + it
where LogSales is the natural logarithm of monthly sales in a given product category for
store i in month-year t; LogP opulation is the natural logarithm of the population of the
nearest bases(s) to store i in month-year t; U nemploymentRate is the monthly unemployment rate in Commissary or Exchange i’s county; P reBan is a dummy equal to 1 if t is
in the pre-regulation period of October 2005 thru September 2007; φ are month-year fixed
effects; θ are store fixed effects and  is an error term. N earShop is a dummy equal to 1 if
there exists at least 1 payday loan shop within a 10 mile radius of store i. Stores that could
not be matched to base population data were dropped. Stores with structural changes (e.g.
an opening of a new store facility, closings for renovations) or that are affected by Hurricane
Katrina were dropped. Exchange data is only available from Army, Air Force and marine
installations. Total monthly store sales are the sum of sales in the product categories that
are present in all stores for all periods (See Table 1 in Appendix). Errors are clustered at the
state level and are in parentheses. Sales are for the period of October 2005 thru September
2010.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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A
A.1
A.1.1

For Online Publication Only Appendix
Robustness Checks
Transitional Period

In October 2006, news broke that the MLA was going to take effect in October
2007. It is plausible that payday loan supply and demand adjusted after the
announcement in preparation for the MLA taking effect. Furthermore, the loss
of payday loan usage after the MLA might have come as a surprise to some
borrowers who regularly depend on payday loans. For example, borrowers may
have planned to rollover a loan but found out that they were prohibited from
doing so and were obligated to pay back the loan in full. Such a shock may have
led people to consume over the next few cycles in a fashion similar to those
who have liquidity constraints, which would exaggerate the positive effects of
payday loans in the difference-in-difference framework. As a robustness check,
I reran the timing specification in Equation 4 over the dataset but omitted
observations between October 2006 and September 2008, treating this length
of time as a transitional period. The estimates of the triple difference-indifference coefficient, ρ, are reported in Table 7. The coefficient estimates
have very similar magnitudes, signs and significance as those found in Table
4 Panel A in which the transitional period is included. Thus, the smoothing
results are not driven by transitional adjustments.
A.1.2

Propensity Score Matching

There might be some concern that the results found in the previous section
may be driven less by access to payday loans and more by characteristic differences between the locations of treatment and control groups. This concern
is most evident when looking at the geographic location of payday loan banning states in the United States. In Figure 1, we see that these states are
concentrated in the Northeast. Thus, it may be the case that there are intrinsic differences between Northeast and non-Northeast states such that the
non-Northeast states received treatment of payday loans. If this is the case,
then the difference-in-difference analysis done in the previous section would
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be invalid. In this section, I will re-estimate the results in the timing section,
Section 4.1 using a propensity score matching technique.
The main assumption in propensity score matching is that potential outcomes are independent of treatment group conditional on propensity score
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The propensity score is the probability of being
treated conditional on covariate values. I calculate a propensity score for the
treatment measure “Near Shop” using a logit specification. The covariates I
use for the model are a mix of state and base level variables chosen to maximize balance between the matched set of treatment and control stores. A list
of the covariates is located in Appendix Table 8. The covariates are chosen
from a pool of variables that might explain why a state or geographic location
received treatment.
I match control group stores to each of the treatment group stores by nearest neighbor propensity score matching with replacement. Appendix Figure
3 presents the standardized percent bias for each covariate for both the full
sample of stores and for the matched subsample. This statistic is 100 times the
difference of the covariate means of the treatment and control groups divided
by the square root of the average covariate sample variances of the treated and
control groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). As seen in the figure, matching
does reduce this bias measure for most of these covariates.
Using the matched subsample, I calculate a triple difference-in-difference
estimator in a similar fashion as the difference-in-difference estimator presented
in Todd (1999). In order to adjust for the triple difference in my setting, I
use the difference in the means of sales on paydays and non-paydays as the
outcome variable of interest. Formally, the estimator is:
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(8)
where D = 1 indicates treatment group; i is indexing commissaries; subscript
n indicates non-paydays; subscript p indicates paydays; superscript t indicates the pre-regulation period of October 1, 2005 thru September 30, 2007;
0
superscript t indicates the post-regulation period of October 1, 2007 thru
September 30, 2010; a subscript of 1 indicates treatment (having access to
payday loan stores within a 10 mile radius); a subscript of 0 indicates no
treatment; A is a set of dates; x is the quantity of members in the indicated
set; Y is log total daily sales; and m(i) is the indexing of a commissary that
is the nearest neighbor propensity score match to store i. m(i) is such that
Dm(i) = 0, i.e. from the control group. Given the sampling technique, this
estimate is interpreted as the average treatment effect on the treated. These
triple difference-in-difference estimates are presented in Table 8. We see that
all estimates are positive and almost all are significant at the 10% level. The
magnitudes are a bit larger than those found in the Section 4.1, however the
interpretation remains that payday loans enable consumption smoothing.
A.1.3

Car-title Loans

The main types of credit that are affected by the MLA are payday loans, cartitle loans and tax refund anticipation loans. It may be that some of the effects
that I find cannot be fully attributed to payday loan access but to access to
one of the other credit instruments banned by the MLA. In the time period of
study, tax refund anticipation loans were legal in all states. Thus their effect is
cancelled out in the difference-in-difference estimation as both the control and
treatment group lose access to these loans. Car-title loans on the other hand
were legal in a subset of the states that allowed payday loans and in one state
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(Georgia) that banned payday loans. Thus there is a possibility that the effect
of payday loans is confounded by the simultaneous treatment of car-title loan
access. To check for this, I reran the timing specification in Equation 4 for
Commissaries in states that do not allow car-title loans. The estimates of the
triple difference-in-difference coefficient, ρ, are reported in Table 9. The results
remain as before. Thus, there is assurance that payday loans specifically are
causing the smoothing results.

A.2

Alcohol and Tobacco Prices

One confounding issue in Exchange data as opposed to that of the Commissary
is that the pricing of tobacco and all forms of alcohol track local or state prices
due to regulations.56 For example, liquor prices cannot be priced more than 10
percent less than the best local shelf price in Alcohol Beverage Control (ABC)
States and 5 percent less than the best local shelf price in non-ABC States.
Though “local” is not explicitly defined and there are indications that these
pricing directives are not always obeyed,57 it is possible that the results in this
section are driven by exogenous price movements. Thus, I examine state level
price changes with the assumption that military demand does not affect state
product prices. I was able to obtain tobacco prices at the state level from
the Centers for Disease Control and the Prevention State Tobacco Tracking
and Evaluation System. I obtained pricing information for beer, wine and
general cost of living at an “urban city” level from the Council for Community
and Economic Research. For the latter set of data, I created a state price by
averaging the prices in urban cities in each state for each date. Data on tobacco
are annual while while others are quarterly. I run the following specification:
LogP ricest = α + βP reRegulationt × StateAllows + φt + θs + st

(9)

where LogP rice is the natural logarithm of average price for state s over time
period t; P reRegulation is a dummy equal to 1 if t is in the pre-regulation
before September 2007; StateAllow is a dummy equal to 1 if s is a state that
allows payday loans; φ are time period fixed effects; θ are state fixed effects
56
57

DoD Instruction 1330.09
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/economy/maps-military-tobacco
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and  is an error term. Estimates of β are presented in Appendix Table 7. We
see in this table that there are no clear indications that prices moved in states
in such a way that would lead military personnel to purchase more beer and
wine.

A.3

Present-biased Preferences

To estimate a daily discount rate, I run the following specification using daily
Commissary sales data:
LogSalesit = α + βDaysSinceP aydayt + φt + θi + it

(10)

where DaysSinceP ayday is an integer indicating the number of days t is from
payday in the paycycle and all other variables are as before. β is interpreted
as the percentage change in sales for every day beyond payday. Results of β
estimates are presented in Appendix Table 15. What is of interest is the change
in daily consumption rather than the change in daily expenditures. I assume,
like Huffman and Barenstein, that the daily decline in consumption within
a paycycle is 50% of the decline in expenditures. Huffman and Barenstein
view this adjustment as a conservative lower bound of the daily decline in
consumption because the daily decline of expenditures on instant consumption
goods is 70% of the daily decline of total expenditures. In produce, the sales
category that most closely tracks consumption, sales go down by 1.5% a day.
Applying Huffman and Barenstein’s adjustment, these expenditure declines
imply consumption declines of 0.75% a day over a paycycle that is on average
15 days long. In comparison, Shapiro (2005) finds consumption declines close
to 0.4% over a 30 day food stamp paycycle.
As in Shapiro (2005), if consumers are time consistent exponential discounters maximizing:

U=

T
X

δ t−1 u(Ct )

(11)

t=1

s.t.

W =

T
X
Pt C t
t=1
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Rt

,

(12)

where C is units of consumption, u(.) is the special case of isoelastic utility
1−ρ
(i.e. u(C) = C1−ρ ), δ is a daily discount factor, t is the day in a paycycle of
length T, P is the price of a unit of consumption good, W the is amount of
paycycle salary that is devoted to commissary good consumption and R is the
gross interest rate, then their paycycle consumption follows:
r + γ − ∆pt+1
,
(13)
ρ
where lower case letters are logs of their upper case equivalents, γ = log δ and
∆ denote changes.58 Note here that I assume that no borrowing can occur as
the consumer is in the post-ban period. I assume that the within paycycle price
changes is 0. Interest paying checking accounts yielded a 1.0008 gross interest
rate during the post-ban period,59 which translates into a daily gross interest
rate close to 1 and an r close to 0. Assuming log utility (ρ = 1), the 0.75% a
day decline in consumption found in my data implies a daily discount factor
of 0.9925 and an annual discount factor of 0.06, much lower than reasonably
expected. Hence, this result calls into question the validity of consumers being
exponential discounters.
If consumers are time inconsistent, on the other hand, and have quasihyperbolic preferences such that:
∆ct+1 =

U = u(C1 ) +

T
X

ξδ t−1 u(Ct )

(14)

t=2

then they discount by ξδ from t = 2 to t = 1 but discount only by δ from
t = 3 to t = 2. Here, consuming in the present is much more valuable than
consuming at other points in the future (hence the term “present-biased”).
Assuming log utility, δ = 1 and daily consumption declines of .75% over 15
days, I calibrate ξ = .96.60 This is exactly the same estimate that Shapiro finds
for the food stamp recipient population and asses to be reasonable compared
to estimates from other studies. The similarities between the consumption
58

For more details, see Shapiro (2005).
FRED from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Federal.
60
See Shapiro (2005) for details of this calibration.
59
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patterns of the military population and that of food stamp recipients indicate
that the military population may posses present-biased preferences.
Appendix Figure 1: 2013 USAA Military Pay Calendar

Source: www.usaa.com
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Appendix Figure 2: Paycycle Sales Pattern (Second Paycycle from Each Month
Only)

Note: Data from post-ban period.
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Appendix Figure 3: Balance
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Appendix Table 1: Exchange Product Categories
CATEGORY
Electronics

SUBCATEGORY: AAFES
Photo Equipment
Computers
TV/Stereo
Tobacco
Tobacco
Alcohol
Wine
Beer/Ale
Liquor
Commissary-Like
Food
Soda
Toiletries
Household Cleaning Supplies
Stationary
Clothing
Men’s Clothing
Men’s Furnishings
Women’s Outerwear
Women’s Lingerie
Footwear
Entertainment
Books/Magazines
CDs/DVDs
Toys
Sports Goods
Uniforms
Military Clothing
Home
Linens
Kitchen
Home Accents
Outdoor Living
Appliances
Appliances
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Grocery
0.0251∗∗∗
(0.0014)
165566

Produce
0.0221∗∗∗
(0.0013)
162426

Meat
0.0399∗∗∗
(0.0022)
157976

where LogSales is the natural logarithm of daily sales of a product category for Commissary store i on date t; φ are controls for time
(specifically: day of week, federal holidays, Social Security payout days; early paycheck days and paycycle indicator variables); θ are
store fixed effects; P ayday is a dummy variable equal to 1 if t is a payday and and P reviousP aycycleLength is the number of days
in the paycycle previous to the paycycle of date t. Errors are clustered at the state level and are in parentheses. Commissary stores
with structural changes (e.g. an opening of a new store facility, closings for renovations) or that were affected by Hurricane Katrina
are dropped. Sales are from the post-ban period of October 1, 2007 thru September 30, 2010.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

LogSalesit = α + φt + θi + βP aydayt + γP aydayt × P reviousP aycycleLengtht + it

Note: Table presents the estimates of the γ coefficients in the following regression:

N

Payday x PreviousPaycycleLength

Total
0.0260∗∗∗
(0.0014)
165566

Dependent Variable: Log Daily Sales

Appendix Table 2: Payday Spending Given Previous Paycycle Length
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-0.0005
(0.0097)
156183
Yes
No

-0.0185∗
(0.0105)
275999
Yes
No

Payday x NearShop x PreBan

-0.0397∗∗
(0.0162)
119816
Yes
No

0.0156
(0.0285)
-0.0169
(0.0101)
275999
Yes
Yes

-0.0040
(0.0256)

0.0004
(0.0095)
156183
Yes
Yes

-0.0218
(0.0240)

-0.0375∗∗
(0.0159)
119816
Yes
Yes

0.0129
(0.0282)

>14 Days
0.0290∗
(0.0147)

where LogSales is the natural logarithm of daily total sales for Commissary store i on date t; P ayday is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if t is on payday; P reBan is a dummy equal to 1 if t is in the pre-regulation period of October 1, 2005 thru September 30,
2007; N earShop is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists at least 1 payday loan shop within a 10 mile radius of the Commissary; φ are
controls for time (specifically: day of week, federal holidays, Social Security payout days, early paycheck days and paycycle indicator
variables); θ are store fixed effects; ξ are all the interaction terms between day of week indicator variables, N earShop and P reBan,
as well as interactions between P ayday and day of week, P ayday and the number of days store i is open in a given paycycle and
P ayday and number of days in a given paycycle if “Payday Controls” are present and interaction terms between P ayday and the
monthly unemployment rate in Commissary i’s county if “Unemployment Controls” are present and  is an error term. Errors are
clustered at the state level and are in parentheses. Commissary stores with structural changes (e.g. an opening of a new store facility,
closings for renovations) or that were affected by Hurricane Katrina are dropped. Sales are from the period of October 1, 2005 thru
September 30, 2010.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

LogSalesit = α + βP aydayt + γP aydayt × P reBant + δP aydayt × N earShopi + ρP aydayt × N earShopi × P reBant + φt + θi + ξit + it

Note: Table presents the estimates of the γ, δ and ρ coefficients in the following triple difference-in-difference specification:

N
Payday Controls
Unemployment Controls

-0.0209
(0.0242)

-0.0021
(0.0259)

Payday x NearShop

Payday x PreBan

Dependent Variable: Log Total Daily Sales
Previous Paycycle Length
All
14 Days or Less >14 Days
All
14 Days or Less
0.0015
0.0038
0.0120
0.0130
0.0077
(0.0093)
(0.0079)
(0.0142) (0.0097)
(0.0086)

Appendix Table 3: The Impact of Payday Loan Access on the Timing of Expenditures

Appendix Table 4: Impact of Payday Loan Access on the Timing of Consumption with Varying Previous Paycycle Length
Dependent Variable: Log Daily Total Sales

Payday x Access x PreBan x PreviousPaycycleLength
N

Access
State Allow Near Shop
-0.0121∗
-0.0105∗∗
(0.0061)
(0.0048)
275999
275999

Number of Shops
-0.0010∗∗
(0.0004)
275999

Note: The table presents the coefficient estimate on the quadruple interaction term of
variables P ayday, Access, P reBan and P reviousP aycycleLength in a quadruple differencein-difference specification. All the double, triple and quadruple interactions of these variables
are included in the specification as well as P ayday, θi , φt and ξit . The dependent variable
is the natural logarithm of daily total Commissary sales for store i on date t; P ayday is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if t is a payday; P reBan is a dummy equal to 1 if t is in the preregulation period of October 1, 2005 thru September 30, 2007; P reviousP aycycleLength is a
variable that contains the number of days in the paycycle preceding the paycycle containing
date t; φ are controls for time (specifically: day of week, federal holidays, Social Security
payout dates, early paycheck dates and paycycle indicator variables); θ are store fixed effects;
ξ are all the interaction terms between day of week indicator variables, Access and P reBan
and the interaction terms between P ayday and day of week, P ayday and the number of
days store i is open in a given paycycle and P ayday and number of days in a given paycycle
and  is an error term. Access is one of three measures indicating access to payday loans.
Specifically, “State Allow” is a dummy equal to 1 if a Commissary is located in a state that
allows payday loans, “Near Shop” is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists at least 1 payday
loan shop within its 10 mile radius and “Number of Shops” is the number of payday loan
shops within a 10 mile radius of the commissary top coded at 10 shops. Commissary stores
with structural changes (e.g. an opening of a new store facility, closings for renovations) or
that were affected by Hurricane Katrina are dropped. Errors are clustered at the state level
and are in parentheses. Sales are from the period of October 1, 2005 thru September 30,
2010.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

53

Appendix Table 5: The Impact of Payday Loan Access on the Timing of
Expenditures by Product Category for Paycycles Preceded by More than 14
Days without a Payday
Dependent Variable: Log Daily Sales
Payday x NearShop x PreBan
N

Grocery
-0.0350∗∗
(0.0165)
119816

Produce
-0.0346∗∗
(0.0135)
117545

Meat
-0.0278∗
(0.0144)
114345

Note: Table presents the estimates of the ρ coefficient in the following triple difference-indifference specification:
LogSalesit = α + βP aydayt + γP aydayt × P reBant + δP aydayt × N earShopi +
ρP aydayt × N earShopi × P reBant + φt + θi + ξit + it
where LogSales is the natural logarithm of daily sales for Commissary store i on date t in a
given product category; P ayday is a dummy variable equal to 1 if t is on payday; P reBan
is a dummy equal to 1 if t is in the pre-regulation period of October 1, 2005 thru September
30, 2007; N earShop is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists at least 1 payday loan shop within
a 10 mile radius of the Commissary; φ are controls for time (specifically: day of week,
federal holidays, Social Security payout days, early paycheck days and paycycle indicator
variables); θ are store fixed effects; ξ are all the interaction terms between day of week
indicator variables, N earShop and P reBan and  is an error term. Errors are clustered at
the state level and are in parentheses. Commissary stores with structural changes (e.g. an
opening of a new store facility, closings for renovations) or that are affected by Hurricane
Katrina were dropped. Sales are from the period of October 1, 2005 thru September 30,
2010.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Appendix Table 6: Impact of Payday Loan Access on the Timing of Expenditures
Dependent Variable: Log Total Daily Sales
Panel A: Access Measured by “State Allow”
Previous Paycycle Length
All
14 Days or Less
Payday x State Allow x PreBan -0.0098
0.0087
(0.0117)
(0.0100)
N
275999
156183

>14 Days
-0.0303
(0.0188)
119816

Panel B: Access Measured by “Number of Shops”
Previous Paycycle Length
All
14 Days or Less
Payday x Number of Shops x PreBan -0.0022∗∗
-0.0010
(0.0009)
(0.0009)
N
275999
156183

>14 Days
-0.0036∗∗
(0.0014)
119816

Note: Table presents the estimates of the ρ coefficient in the following triple difference-indifference specification:
LogSalesit = α + βP aydayt + γP aydayt × P reBant + δP aydayt × Accessi +
ρP aydayt × Accessi × P reBant + φt + θi + ξit + it
where LogSales is the natural logarithm of daily sales for Commissary store i on date t
in a given product category; P ayday is a dummy variable equal to 1 if t is on payday;
P reBan is a dummy equal to 1 if t is in the pre-regulation period of October 1, 2005 thru
September 30, 2007; Access is is a measure indicating access to payday loans. Specifically,
“State Allow” is a dummy equal to 1 if a Commissary is located in a state that allows payday
loans and “Number of Shops” is the number of payday loan shops within a 10 mile radius
of the commissary top coded at 10 shops. φ are controls for time (specifically: day of week,
federal holidays, Social Security payout days, early paycheck days and paycycle indicator
variables); θ are store fixed effects; ξ are all the interaction terms between day of week
indicator variables, Access and P reBan and  is an error term. Errors are clustered at
the state level and are in parentheses. Commissary stores with structural changes (e.g. an
opening of a new store facility, closings for renovations) or that are affected by Hurricane
Katrina were dropped. Sales are from the period of October 1, 2005 thru September 30,
2010.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Appendix Table 7: The Impact of Payday Loan Access on the Level of Expenditures with Access Measured by “State Allow”
Dependent Variable: Log Monthly Sales
Panel A: Commissaries
Total
State Allow x PreBan 0.0020
(0.0147)
N
8246

Grocery Produce
0.0048
-0.0061
(0.0142) (0.0175)
8246
8246

Meat
-0.0125
(0.0248)
8246

Panel B: Exchanges
Total
Commissary-Like Alcohol
∗∗
State Allow x PreBan 0.0608
0.0454
0.0831∗∗
(0.0245)
(0.0308)
(0.0312)
N
4200
4200
4200
Uniforms
State Allow x PreBan -0.0135
(0.0279)
N
4200

Appliances
0.0372
(0.0336)
4200

Electronics
0.0683∗∗
(0.0262)
4200

Tobacco
0.0376
(0.0293)
4200

Home
0.0513∗
(0.0269)
4200

Clothing
0.0077
(0.0230)
4200

Entertainment
-0.0136
(0.0308)
4200

Note: Table presents the estimates of the β coefficients in the following regression:
LogSalesit
=
α + βStateAllowi × P reBant + γLogP opulationit +
ηU nemploytmentRateit + φt + θi + it
where LogSales is the natural logarithm of monthly sales in a given product category for
store i in month-year t; LogP opulation is the natural logarithm of the population of the
nearest bases(s) to store i in month-year t; U nemploymentRate is the monthly unemployment rate in Commissary or Exchange i’s county; P reBan is a dummy equal to 1 if t is
in the pre-regulation period of October 2005 thru September 2007; φ are month-year fixed
effects; θ are store fixed effects and  is an error term. StateAllow is a dummy equal to 1 if
Commissary i is located in State that allows payday loans. Stores that could not be matched
to base population data were dropped. Stores with structural changes (e.g. an opening of a
new store facility, closings for renovations) or that are affected by Hurricane Katrina were
dropped. Exchange data is only available from Army, Air Force and marine installations.
Total monthly store sales are the sum of sales in the product categories that are present in
all stores for all periods (See Table 1 in Appendix). Errors are clustered at the state level
and are in parentheses. Sales are for the period of October 2005 thru September 2010 for
Commissaries and Army and Air Force Exchanges and February 2006 thru September 2010
for Marine Exchanges.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Appendix Table 8: The Impact of Payday Loan Access on the Level of Expenditures with Access Measured by “Number of Shops”
Dependent Variable: Log Monthly Sales
Panel A: Commissaries
Number of Shops x PreBan
N

Total
-0.0003
(0.0012)
9420

Grocery Produce
0.0000
0.0001
(0.0012) (0.0016)
9420
9420

Meat
-0.0022
(0.0025)
9420

Panel B: Exchanges
Number of Shops x PreBan
N

Number of Shops x PreBan
N

Total
Commissary-Like Alcohol
∗∗
0.0065
0.0052
0.0073∗∗
(0.0026)
(0.0032)
(0.0028)
4200
4200
4200
Uniforms
0.0021
(0.0033)
4200

Appliances
0.0046
(0.0050)
4200

Electronics
0.0091∗∗∗
(0.0028)
4200

Tobacco
0.0057
(0.0038)
4200

Home
0.0044
(0.0035)
4200

Note: Table presents the estimates of the β coefficients in the following regression:
LogSalesit
=
α + βN umberof Shopsi × P reBant + γLogP opulationit +
ηU nemploytmentRateit + φt + θi + it
where LogSales is the natural logarithm of monthly sales in a given product category for
store i in month-year t; LogP opulation is the natural logarithm of the population of the
nearest bases(s) to store i in month-year t; U nemploymentRate is the monthly unemployment rate in Commissary or Exchange i’s county; P reBan is a dummy equal to 1 if t is
in the pre-regulation period of October 2005 thru September 2007; φ are month-year fixed
effects; θ are store fixed effects and  is an error term. N umberof Shops is the number of
payday loan shop within a 10 mile radius of store i topcoded at 10 shops. Stores that could
not be matched to base population data were dropped. Stores with structural changes (e.g.
an opening of a new store facility, closings for renovations) or that are affected by Hurricane
Katrina were dropped. Exchange data is only available from Army, Air Force and marine
installations. Total monthly store sales are the sum of sales in the product categories that
are present in all stores for all periods (See Table 1 in Appendix). Errors are clustered
at the state level and are in parentheses. Sales are for the period of October 2005 thru
September 2010 for Commissaries and Army and Air Force Exchanges and February 2006
thru September 2010 for Marine Exchanges.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Clothing
0.0008
(0.0037)
4200

Entertainment
0.0004
(0.0042)
4200
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army*
navy

State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
Base
Base
Base
Base
Base
Base
Base
Base

% Individuals below poverty, 2005-2007

% Individuals not covered by health insurance, 2006

Median Household Income (2007 Dollars), 2005-2007
Christian Power Index, 2007

Average Delegation Christian Political Score, 2007

% of Popular vote for President in 2004 Election going to Republican

% of families with income less than $50K (2005-2007)

FDIC-insured institution to population ratio, 2006
Population to Area ratio, 2006

Distance from base to closest neighboring city

% of Active Duty with a higher than high school education, October 2007
Mean Age, October 2007

% of Active Duty that are white, October 2007

Number of Active Duty Personnel, October 2007
Dummy for Marine Corps Base
Dummy for Air Force Base
Dummy for Army Base

Dummy for Navy Base
Base
Note:
BLS - Bureau of Labor Statistics
SMADB - U.S. Census Bureau State and Metropolitan Area Data Book (2010)
DMDA - Defense Manpower Data Agency
*Variable not used in calculation of propensity score but used to evaluate balance.

airforce

marines

total_pop

pct_white

mean_age_area

pct_above_HS

city_distance

density*

bank_pc

income_low

republican_04

del_sc

cpi

med_hh_income_07

no_health_insurance_06

ind_pov_percent

unemployment_rate

County

Unemployment rate, July 2007

Abbreviation

Level

Covariate

Appendix Table 9: Propensity Score Covariates

navy.mil

goarmy.com

airforce.com

marines.mil

DMDA

DMDA

DMDA

DMDA

Google Maps

SMADB

FDIC, SMADB

SMADB

SMADB

Graves & Peterson (2008)

Graves & Peterson (2008)

SMADB

SMADB

SMADB

BLS

Source

Appendix Table 10: Robustness: The Impact of Payday Loan Access on the
Timing of Consumption Using Propensity Score Matching
Dependent Variable: Log Daily Sales
All
Triple Difference-in-Difference -0.0254
(0.0163)

14 Days or Less
-0.0109
(0.0156)

>14 Days
-0.0383∗∗
(0.0195)

Note: Table presents the triple difference-in-difference matching estimator. All Commissaries that have at least 1 payday loan shop within their 10 mile radius are in the sample
and are considered the treated group (D = 1). Each of these Commissaries is matched to
a Commissary that does not have any payday loan shops within its 10 mile radius using
nearest neighbor propensity score matching with replacement and considered the untreated
group (D = 0). The estimates are calculated as follows:
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where i is indexing Commissaries; subscript n indicates non-paydays; subscript p indicates
paydays; superscript t indicates the pre-regulation period of October 1, 2005 thru September
0
30, 2007; superscript t indicates the post-regulation period of October 1, 2007-September
30, 2010; a subscript of 1 indicates treatment (being in a state that allows payday loans);
a subscript of 0 indicates no treatment; A is a set of dates; x is the quantity of members
in the indicated set; Y is log total daily sales; and m(i) is the indexing of a Commissary
that is the nearest neighbor propensity score match to store i. m(i) is such that Dm(i) = 0.
The interpretation of the presented estimates are treatment effect on the treated. Errors
are bootstrapped. Sales are from the period of October 1, 2005 thru September 30, 2010.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Appendix Table 11: Robustness: Impact of Payday Loan Access on the Timing
of Expenditures, Omitting 10/2006-9/2008
Dependent Variable: Log Total Daily Sales
Previous Paycycle Length
All
14 Days or Less
Payday x NearShop x PreBan -0.0153
-0.0032
(0.0122)
(0.0114)
N
165337
88778

>14 Days
-0.0279∗
(0.0165)
76559

Note: Table presents the estimates of the ρ coefficient in the following triple difference-indifference specification:
LogSalesit = α + βP aydayt + γP aydayt × P reBant + δP aydayt × N earShopi +
ρP aydayt × N earShopi × P reBant + φt + θi + ξit + it
where LogSales is the natural logarithm of daily sales for Commissary store i on date t in a
given product category; P ayday is a dummy variable equal to 1 if t is on payday; P reBan
is a dummy equal to 1 if t is in the pre-regulation period of October 1, 2005 thru September
30, 2007; N earShop is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists at least 1 payday loan shop within
a 10 mile radius of the Commissary; φ are controls for time (specifically: day of week,
federal holidays, Social Security payout days, early paycheck days and paycycle indicator
variables); θ are store fixed effects; ξ are all the interaction terms between day of week
indicator variables, N earShop and P reBan and  is an error term. Errors are clustered at
the state level and are in parentheses. Commissary stores with structural changes (e.g. an
opening of a new store facility, closings for renovations) or that are affected by Hurricane
Katrina were dropped. Sales are from the period of October 1, 2005 thru September 28,
2006 and October 1, 2008 thru September 30, 2010.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Appendix Table 12: Robustness: Impact of Payday Loan Access on the Timing
of Consumption, Omitting Car Title Loan Allowing States
Dependent Variable: Log Total Daily Sales
Previous Paycycle Length
All
14 Days or Less
∗∗
Payday x NearShop x PreBan -0.0322
-0.0237∗
(0.0116)
(0.0132)
N
120585
68254

>14 Days
-0.0430∗∗
(0.0155)
52331

Note: Table presents the estimates of the ρ coefficient in the following triple difference-indifference specification:
LogSalesit = α + βP aydayt + γP aydayt × P reBant + δP aydayt × N earShopi +
ρP aydayt × N earShopi × P reBant + φt + θi + ξit + it
where LogSales is the natural logarithm of daily sales for Commissary store i on date t in a
given product category; P ayday is a dummy variable equal to 1 if t is on payday; P reBan
is a dummy equal to 1 if t is in the pre-regulation period of October 1, 2005 thru September
30, 2007; N earShop is a dummy equal to 1 if there exists at least 1 payday loan shop within
a 10 mile radius of the Commissary; φ are controls for time (specifically: day of week,
federal holidays, Social Security payout days, early paycheck days and paycycle indicator
variables); θ are store fixed effects; ξ are all the interaction terms between day of week
indicator variables, N earShop and P reBan and  is an error term. Errors are clustered at
the state level and are in parentheses. Commissary stores with structural changes (e.g. an
opening of a new store facility, closings for renovations) or that are affected by Hurricane
Katrina were dropped. Sales are from the period of October 1, 2005 thru September 30,
2010.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Appendix Table 13: The Relationship between MilitaryPayday Loan Access
and State Price Changes
Dependent Variable: Log Prices
PreBan x StateAllow
N

Log Tobacco Price
0.0249
(0.0360)
230

Log Beer Price
0.0133
(0.0228)
697

Log Wine Price
-0.0056
(0.0370)
697

Log of Cost of Living Index
-0.0011
(0.0077)
697

Note: Table presents the estimates of the β coefficients in the following regression:
LogP ricest = α + βP reBant × StateAllows + φt + θs + st
where LogP rice is the natural logarithm of average price for state s over time period t;
P reBan is a dummy equal to 1 if t is before September 2007; StateAllow is a dummy equal
to 1 if s is a state that allows payday loans; φ are time period fixed effects; θ are state fixed
effects and  is an error term. For Tobacco, t is annual, data spans 2005-2010 and 2007 is
dropped. For Beer and Wine, t is quarterly and the data spans the fourth quarter of 2005
thru the third quarter of 2010 with the 4th quarter missing in 2007, 2008 and 2009 as they
are not available in the data. Errors are clustered at the state level and are in parentheses.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Sources: Tobacco prices from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention State Tobacco
Tracking and Evaluation System. All other product prices and cost of living index from the
Council for Community and Economic Research.

Appendix Table 14: Frequency of Paycycles of Given Characteristics

Paycycle Length (Days)
11
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Total

Preceding Paycycle Length (Days)
11 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0 15 10 12 12
8
5
1
0
8
1
2
1
0
0
0
0 14
0
0
1
0
0
0
1 12
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1 63 13 14 15
8
5
1

Note: Paycycles are from October 1, 2005 thru September 30, 2010.
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Total
1
63
12
15
15
8
5
1
120

Appendix Table 15: Daily Discount Rate
Dependent Variable: Log Daily Sales
DaysSincePayday
N

Total
-0.0188∗∗∗
(0.0006)
165566

Grocery
-0.0189∗∗∗
(0.0007)
165566

Produce
-0.0150∗∗∗
(0.0005)
162426

Meat
-0.0224∗∗∗
(0.0007)
157976

Note: Table presents the estimates of the β coefficients in the following regression:
LogSalesit = α + βDaysSinceP aydayt + φt + θi + it
where LogSales is the natural logarithm of daily sales in a given product category for
Commissary store i on date t; DaysSinceP ayday is a continuous variable pertaining to the
number of days t is from the closest preceding payday; EarlyAccess is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if t is on or after the last business day in a paycycle; φ are controls for time
(specifically: day of week, federal holidays, Social Security payout dates, early paycheck
dates and paycycle indicator variables); θ are store fixed effects and  is an error term.
Errors are clustered at the state level and are in parentheses. Sales are from the post-ban
period of October 1, 2007 thru September 30, 2010.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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